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Summary
Economist Bernard Hoekman analyzes the state of economic integration in the Middle East and North Africa and concludes that MENA countries 
have failed to reach their economic potential in large part due to trade barriers, 
failure to diversify their economies, and lack of investment incentives. He 
questions the prospects of relying on top-down, traditional trade agreements 
such as those typically pursued by the Arab League, and instead proposes cross-
border economic cooperation on an à la carte, bottom-up, pragmatic basis. This 
strategy, he argues, offers greater prospects for countries of the Middle East to 
establish conditions for shared prosperity. 
Key Findings
  In recent years, MENA accounted for 3 percent of agriculture exports, 2 
percent of manufactures exports, and 2.5 percent of services exports globally
  A typical MENA country exports less than half, and as little as one quarter, 
of its potential
  Ambitious ‘top-down’ regional initiatives central to MENA international 
relations have failed to bring about increased trade and economic growth
  Intra-regional trade offers an opportunity for MENA to boost economic 
growth and job creation through lower non-tariff barriers and reduced trade 
costs
  Regional cooperation in MENA offers better prospects for supporting growth 
if pursued on an à la carte, bottom-up, pragmatic basis involving greater 
participation from businesses and communities
  Much like Europe, regional cooperation could generate long-term payoffs 
for MENA that go beyond economic growth by creating incentives to sustain 
peace and security
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Introduction
It has often been argued that countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) can do much more to leverage international market opportunities 
to accelerate economic growth and job creation. Excluding petroleum 
exports, the MENA region,1 with over 400 million people, exports roughly 
the same amount as 
Switzerland.2 With a 
population of over 500 
million inhabitants 
and an average per 
capita income of some 
$36,000 in 2014,3 the 
European Union is a major market in close geographic proximity to many 
MENA states. India, China, other parts of Asia, as well as sub-Saharan Africa, 
offer dynamic markets and great potential as sources of demand for goods and 
services. Major economies in the region offer good trade growth prospects as 
well, most notably Iraq and Iran, both countries that in the past have played 
an important role in the regional economy. 
Harnessing this potential is a necessary condition for the MENA region 
to generate the broad-based economic growth and job creation it so urgently 
needs. The pursuit of policies by many governments in the region, designed to 
benefit specific politically connected groups in society, and an unwillingness to 
establish an environment supportive of private sector dynamism have proven 
very costly.4 They helped to generate the dynamics that resulted in the conflicts 
convulsing many parts of the region and the resulting destruction of property, 
refugee flows, and internally displaced people. The asymmetrically distributed 
benefits of the policies implemented before the Arab Spring also created a 
significant opportunity cost in the form of reputational harm done to the policy 
recommendations long advocated by international organizations such as the 
European Union, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank. Avoidance 
of an overvalued exchange rate, an open trade and investment regime, pro-
competitive regulation, contestable markets, transparency, accountability, and 
rule of law remain fundamental elements of any incentive framework conducive 
“the MENA region, with over 400 
million people, exports roughly 
the same amount as Switzerland.”
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to sustained high rates of investment in tradables, employment growth, and rising 
household real incomes. Overcoming public distrust, generating the political 
support needed for implementing policy reforms supportive of investment and 
trade, and establishing the institutions shown to be necessary for sustained 
high growth in other parts of the world are key challenges confronting MENA 
policymakers.
MENA countries vary widely in the degree to which they are integrated into the 
global economy. As discussed below, some countries are at the top of globalization 
rankings for specific dimensions of international integration. Most countries do 
not participate in the forms of value chain production and trade that have driven 
growth in East Asia and in Central and Eastern European countries. A prominent 
feature of the region is that there is only limited trade between neighboring 
countries, despite 
regional integration 
long having been a 
purported goal of 
the Arab states. A 
variety of initiatives 
have been pursued 
in the past 50 or so years to promote Arab cooperation, including gradual market 
integration under auspices of the Arab League, such as the Pan-Arab Free Trade 
Agreement (PAFTA),5 and the creation of a common market involving Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman within the 
Gulf Cooperation Council (G.C.C.). In some dimensions, such as intra-regional 
capital and labor flows, Arab states are relatively highly integrated, but intra-
regional trade in manufactured products within MENA and with neighboring 
economies such as Turkey is far below levels observed in many other regions.6
There has been extensive analysis of the reasons why MENA countries ‘punch 
below their weight’ in economic terms on global markets and why there has 
been only limited success on the part of energy exporters to diversify. Such 
factors include state dominance of the economy and mismanagement of the 
real exchange rate and associated ‘Dutch disease.’ The role of the state has 
been reflected in high shares of government employment; extensive subsidies 
with associated fiscal burdens; ‘crony capitalism;’ high barriers to trade to 
“MENA countries vary widely in the 
degree to which they are integrated 
into the global economy.”
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protect (connected) incumbents; weak economic governance and ‘red tape’ 
resulting in high transaction costs; and an absence of effective pro-competitive 
regulatory frameworks. Addressing the reasons for the region’s longstanding 
underperformance is important from a political stability and social perspective. 
Other parts of the world have shown that more effective exploitation of world 
markets, reflected in increasing exports of higher value-added goods and services, 
will generate both employment opportunities and higher wages and household 
incomes. 
This paper briefly reviews the extent to which MENA countries are integrated 
into the global economy and with each other, and some of the relevant policy areas 
that impact trade performance and investment incentives. The specific focus is 
on the question of whether re-energizing efforts to integrate markets regionally 
can help address the various factors thought to impede the implementation of 
policies needed for a broader economic growth strategy. Clearly a precondition 
for any such initiatives for the countries currently mired in conflicts is a re-
establishment of peace, political stability, and economic security. The discussion 
that follows does not engage with the here-and-now challenges of ending 
conflicts, nor does it address directly the short-term fiscal consolidation and 
macroeconomic challenges that are currently confronting many governments 
as a result of low energy prices and weak global demand, except to note that 
this may potentially change the incentives to pursue regional cooperation 
more seriously. The focus is on the medium term. A case is made that regional 
integration can and should play a role in addressing the constraints that, to date, 
have held countries back in benefiting from international market opportunities, 
but to do so it must contribute to overcoming the political economy forces that 
have precluded beneficial trade and investment policy reforms. A business-
as-usual approach to intra-regional cooperation is unlikely to do so, given the 
dismal track record to date.7 The region needs new approaches that are more 
pragmatic and directly involve constituencies and interest groups with a clear 
stake in successful cooperation.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1 briefly reviews indicators of the 
extent of international integration of the MENA region, both with respect to the 
world and intra-regionally. Section 2 summarizes the state of play on trade policy 
and trade costs, important factors affecting the ability of firms to exploit trade 
opportunities and support economic growth. Section 3 discusses whether and 
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how regional cooperation could help promote policy reforms that are needed to 
attract greater investment in the region and increase the participation of firms in 
the international value chains that are driving global trade. Section 4 concludes. 
International Integration: State of Play
The MENA region accounted for 6.6 percent of global merchandise trade in 
2014.8 Fuels and other natural resources account for some 77 percent of total 
export value, manufactures for 20 percent, and agriculture for 3 percent. MENA’s 
share in world exports of manufactures was only 2 percent, similar to its share in 
global agricultural trade. Regional export growth in the pre-Arab Spring/global 
financial crisis period was driven mostly by expansion of existing products to 
new markets and new products to existing markets—that is, along the extensive 
margin.9 This can be explained partly by declining sales to a number of traditional 
export markets in Europe,10 but is also an illustration of a gradual increase in 
participation in international production sharing arrangements in sectors 
such as motor vehicles and aeronautics (Morocco) and chemicals (G.C.C. oil 
exporters).11 These were positive developments, but limited to only a subset of 
countries and did not generate enough new opportunities for workers through 
the growth of enough productive firms that together could ‘move the needle’ 
in contributing to export growth and diversification. The MENA region lacks 
“teams of world class exporters to surround and emulate the number ones,” the 
firms that are the market leaders in their sectors.12
The share of global services exports in 2013, as measured by the balance of 
payments, is somewhat higher at 2.5 percent. Transportation and travel (tourism) 
account for the bulk of services exports, with the region as a whole having a 
5.2 and 6.5 percent share of the global total, respectively. Egypt, Morocco, and 
Tunisia rank among the world’s 30 largest net exporters of services (in value), 
helping to partially offset merchandise trade deficits. However, services exports 
have been mainly concentrated in transport and travel. MENA accounts for 
only 1.7 percent of global trade in other commercial services, the largest and 
most dynamic category of global services trade. For all of the three major 
service categories, no MENA country has a global share that exceeds 1 percent. 
Egypt comes closest with a 1 percent share of global transportation services 
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(reflecting Suez Canal revenues). At less than 0.3 percent,13 the region barely 
figures in global exports of services related to goods—manufacturing services 
using physical inputs owned by others, a measure of participation in global 
value chains.
Global flows of F.D.I. tripled in the decade preceding the 2008 financial crisis, 
but inflows into MENA economies increased at an even higher rate—rising from 
0.2 percent in 1990 to 4.6 percent of G.D.P. in 2008. Since 2008, F.D.I. inflows 
dropped by half, to the equivalent of some 2 percent of G.D.P.14 In 2013, total 
F.D.I. inflows were some $45 billion, down from $93 billion in 2008.15 In addition 
to the drop in 
overall inflows of 
F.D.I., there have 
been shifts in the 
allocation since 
2008. The U.A.E., 
Iraq, Kuwait, and 
Morocco have seen 
their shares of the 
total increase substantially, while that of Saudi Arabia has fallen from 42 to 20 
percent.16 With a 22 percent share, the U.A.E. was the largest recipient of F.D.I. 
in 2013.17 What has not changed is that in most countries F.D.I. tends to go 
primarily to the energy and natural resource sector and to nontradables, such as 
real estate and construction, with little going to export-oriented manufacturing 
or high-tech services.18
The trade and investment data makes clear that there is significant 
heterogeneity across countries in the region in terms of production structure 
and trade specialization. For the ‘region’ in the aggregate, fuels and natural 
resource exports dominate, with only limited change in recent decades in the 
share of manufactures. Services are somewhat more competitive, as reflected in 
higher global trade shares, but the two categories of services where the MENA 
share is highest are not activities with high value added. On some measures, 
MENA countries are among the most globalized countries in the world. In a 
recent compilation of globalization indices that considers labor remittance and 
F.D.I. flows, as well as trade in goods and services, Lebanon ranks second, after 
“There is significant heterogeneity 
across countries in the region in 
terms of production structure and 
trade specialization.”
Hoekman6
Singapore. Oman ranks fifth, Bahrain 14th, Kuwait 16th, Jordan 17th, and the 
U.A.E. 22nd.19 Algeria, Syria, and Iran are the least connected internationally in 
this exercise, ranked as 115th, 120th, and 143rd respectively.20 Of course, any 
such ranking is heavily influenced by what is included in the indicators and 
the weights given to constituent components. In the case of Iran, the very low 
ranking reflects the impact of economic sanctions, while the ongoing conflict 
is a major factor in the case of Syria. Nonetheless, this data serves to illustrate 
that many MENA economies are closely linked to the international economy. 
This is partly due to the small size of many of the economies and the structure 
of specialization—oil exporters often have high trade/G.D.P. ratios, employ 
(‘import’) substantial numbers of foreign workers, and generate major inward 
and outward flows of F.D.I. that, in turn, give rise to remittances and repatriation 
of investment earnings. Thus, the G.C.C. as a group ranks 31st in the ESCWA 
exercise, compared to 73rd and 71st, respectively, for the Maghreb and the 
Mashreq countries.21
Such globalization indicators 
measure ‘connectivity’ with the world 
as a whole. Since the global financial 
crisis, the Arab Spring uprisings, 
and the violent conflicts that 
have erupted in several countries, 
connectivity indices have fallen for 
many economies, augmented by a drop in the price of oil resulting from weak 
global demand. However, notwithstanding these disruptive events, compared 
to 2000 there is still a positive trend for many countries: with the exception 
of Saudi Arabia, the G.C.C. has become more connected (globalized), as have 
Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. Several major economies, however, registered 
declines in globalization rankings since 2000, including Iraq (-71 percent), 
Saudi Arabia (-22 percent), and Iran (-15 percent).22 One implication is that 
Iraq and Iran offer the prospect of substantial trade and investment expansion, 
including greater intra-regional exchanges.
There is less integration, or interdependence, if the focus is limited to intra-
regional trade flows. This has insulated countries, to some extent, from the 
effects of the conflicts in parts of the region: the direct trade spillovers have 
“There is less integration, 
or interdependence, if the 
focus is limited to intra-
regional trade flows.”
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been less than they would have been if the region had been more integrated.23 
Intra-regional exports of goods are particularly important for Syria, Lebanon, 
and Jordan (over 40 percent of total exports) and have doubled for Bahrain and 
Egypt since 2000, exceeding 20 percent of total trade in 2013. Intra-regional 
trade in intermediates has also grown, from some 15 percent of the total to the 
low 20 percent range.
Linkages through movement of people are often stronger than linkages 
through trade in MENA, even though a large share of foreign workers in G.C.C. 
countries are not from the region, but instead come from South and East Asian 
countries. As a share of total migration, intra-Arab flows have stayed essentially 
constant since 1990, at around 37 percent of the total stock.24 Many of the workers 
that send back remittances to their families work outside the region. Only 29 
percent of outward remittance flows from Arab countries goes to other Arab 
countries,25 although the figure is much higher for some countries—50 percent 
of remittance flows to Egypt are from workers in the G.C.C.; 60 percent for 
Jordan. One dimension where intra-regional flows are high is for banking—in 
2009 some 60 percent of all foreign banks in Arab countries are of Arab origin, 
up from 43 percent in 2000.26
Goods and services increasingly are produced in regional or global value 
chains (VCs), with value being added to a product by firms located in different 
countries. Much of this foreign value comprises services inputs such as 
research and development (R&D), design, finance, marketing, and distribution. 
The geographic fragmentation of production is reflected in rising vertical 
specialization, with firms in countries producing outputs that are exported and 
further processed in the importing country, which in turn may be exported to a 
third country, and so forth. Some 30-40 percent of world trade today is vertical 
in nature.27 A large share of this VC trade is intra-firm—involving exchanges 
between plants that are part of the same company—which implies that such 
trade is closely linked to F.D.I., and that barriers to F.D.I. will constrain the 
ability of a country to participate in global supply chains.
A striking feature of the MENA region as a whole is that it participates to only 
a very limited extent in international VCs. In the case of oil and mining product 
exporters, VC participation is at the upstream stage, providing inputs that are 
used in other countries—so-called forward linkages in the literature. For oil-
importing countries, exports of manufactured and agricultural goods and 
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services account for some 35 percent of G.D.P., which is quite high compared 
to other developing regions. These exports are largely for final consumption, 
however, meaning they do not comprise goods that are processed further in the 
destination market. The same applies for so-called backward linkages, which 
is the use of imported inputs that are embodied in a processed product that is 
exported. 
An often used crude measure of vertical specialization is intra-industry 
trade (I.I.T.): a measure of the relative importance of imports and exports of 
similar products. Analysts have pointed out for decades that levels of I.I.T. for 
MENA countries are very low. I.I.T. rose somewhat in the 2000s, but remains far 
below what is observed in other regions. Tunisia has the highest share of I.I.T. 
in the MENA region, attaining some 40 percent in the late 2000s, followed by 
Morocco and the U.A.E. The only country in the region with a significant share 
of components in its total exports—a key feature of vertical specialization—is 
Tunisia, which saw the share of parts and components in total exports expand 
from less than 4 percent in 1985 to 10 percent in recent years.28 Tunisia is also 
one of the few countries in the MENA region where F.D.I. in manufacturing
Figure 1. Share of imported value added in exports, 2005
Note: Share is given by solid line; bars indicate estimated contribution of different determinants. 
Source: Kowalski et al. (2015).
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sectors is substantial as a share of total F.D.I. inflows—around 15 percent 
of greenfield investment. As mentioned, export-oriented F.D.I. in several 
manufacturing sectors is also substantial in Morocco. This has been associated 
with increasing demand for locally produced inputs: for example, the Renault 
plant sources 40 percent of its inputs locally, including from suppliers that have 
also invested in the country.29
More detailed analysis of VC participation has become possible as a result of 
major research projects to measure the value-added content of trade. Figure 
1 shows that backward participation in VCs varies across countries in the 
MENA region; Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E. are at the low end with a 
share of around 15 percent, followed by Morocco and Turkey with a ratio of 
some 20 percent. The most integrated MENA countries on this measure of VC 
participation are Lebanon, Tunisia and Jordan. Over 35 percent of the value of 
Jordan’s gross exports reflects imported intermediate inputs. Relative to what is 
predicted based on fundamental factors such as G.D.P., the share of manufacturing 
in G.D.P., and proximity to a global industrial hub, VC participation in many 
MENA countries is below what is predicted by fundamentals. In a number of 
cases policy is found to be relatively supportive, but as discussed further below, 
the O.E.C.D. analysis concludes that trade policies in Morocco, Tunisia, and 
Egypt constrain VC participation, whereas in all MENA economies included in 
the sample, F.D.I.-related policies (investment openness) are a positive factor, 
especially in the countries with the highest VC participation performance—
Tunisia, Jordan, and Lebanon.30
Table 1. Bilateral trade costs for industrial products (percent)
Maghreb Egypt Mashreq Fr/It/Sp Greece
Maghreb 95 126 152 75 151
Egypt 126 112 119 163
Mashreq 152 112 77 149 185
France/Italy/Spain 75 119 149 50 96
Greece 151 163 185 96
G.C.C. 167 111 96 132 169
Source: Shepherd (2011).
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Trade costs are often argued to be one reason for the limited participation 
in VCs. Computations of bilateral trade costs for MENA countries indicate 
that trade costs are typically twice as high in the region as they are in E.U. 
countries, especially for trade between Arab countries. Maghreb countries have 
lower trade costs with Europe than between themselves (Table 1).31 The cost 
differentials relate mainly to distance, trade logistics, and the existence of non-
tariff measures (N.T.M.s). Trade costs are consistently higher for agricultural 
products. This reflects the higher transportation costs (per unit value) and time 
sensitivity of perishables, but also potentially the impact of more controls at the 
borders and non-tariff measures. In short, MENA’s geographic advantages in 
terms of connectivity to major markets such as the European Union are more 
than offset by trade costs. Container dwell times are often substantially above the 
O.E.C.D. average and what prevails in emerging economies in Asia.32 Markets 
for logistics services, including trucking, are fragmented by country, with many 
small providers and few incentives for consolidation and efficiency gains. There 
are relatively few active transport corridors between countries in the region.33
Trade-Related Policies and Costs
In the 1990s, many countries made significant progress in lowering import 
tariffs and other explicit trade restrictions. Tariffs in Egypt, for example, were 
reduced to less than 10 percent on average, (down from over 40 percent in the late 
1980s), most quantitative restrictions were removed, and the trade regime was 
greatly simplified. Similar reforms were implemented in other Mediterranean 
MENA countries. A mix of unilateral, autonomous reductions in import tariffs 
and regional liberalization through trade agreements with each other and with 
major trading partners, such as the European Union, reduced tariff barriers 
significantly. Based on the results of a 2008 survey of trading firms, Hoekman 
and Zarrouk conclude that tariffs were mostly removed on intra-Arab trade and 
customs procedures were perceived to be much less of a problem than in the 
late 1990s.34 In 2001, tariffs were ranked as one of the most important barriers 
to intra-regional trade; in 2008, they were ranked last. Instead, transport-related 
infrastructure and real trade costs, such as trade facilitation, were ranked as 
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the most important constraints. More recent assessments come to the same 
conclusion.35
Factors limiting a positive supply response to trade policy reforms include 
the continued dominant role of the state in many economies36 and barriers to 
entry and high costs of investment in new activities resulting from a plethora 
of regulatory impediments.37 Even on the trade policy front, less was achieved 
than was needed to encourage investment in tradable activities. The average 
uniform tariff equivalent of 
all applied tariffs (ad valorem 
and specific) for a number 
of MENA countries remains 
substantially above that in 
other parts of the world.38 
Moreover, the prevalence 
of N.T.M.s is extensive. Research suggests that the gap introduced between 
domestic and world prices for a given product as the result of N.T.M.s is typically 
large in countries for which data is available (Morocco, Tunisia), especially for 
agricultural goods.39 While progress has been made in streamlining N.T.M.s 
over the last two decades, this has been offset by an increase in the use and 
incidence of technical regulations, product standards, procedural requirements, 
and administrative processes that result in delays and high costs of compliance. 
Firm-level surveys by the International Trade Centre reveal that N.T.M.s are 
considered a major factor impeding trade and reducing profitability, especially 
for intra-regional flows.40 Noteworthy is that firms regard procedures and 
requirements implemented by their own governments as much of a burden on 
exports as those imposed by foreign countries.
Jaud and Freund argue that in many MENA countries, high trade and 
transaction costs, partly resulting from overvalued exchange rates41 and partly a 
reflection of trade barriers that remain relatively high, are a major factor reducing 
competition and competitiveness. Trade-related policy reforms, while significant 
relative to the status quo ante, did not go far enough, especially as countries 
elsewhere in the world did more to remove barriers to trade and lower operating 
costs for firms. The continued prevalence of high ‘red tape’ costs—especially in 
comparison to ‘competing’ countries such as Turkey and Central and Eastern 
“Trade costs are typically twice 
as high in the region as they are 
in E.U. countries.”
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Europe—and dominance of the state in the economy limited the positive effects 
of trade reforms. Behar and Freund conclude that a typical MENA country 
exports less than half, and as little as one quarter, of its potential, controlling 
for standard determinants of trade such as country size, income, and distance 
to partner markets.42 Similarly, Bhattacharya and Wolde also find that a typical 
MENA country exports much less than what it should, given fundamental trade 
determinants,43 although imports are much closer to what would be expected.44 
Bourdet and Persson estimate that improving export and import procedures to 
the best practice level prevailing in the region could increase the value of South 
Mediterranean exports by 34 percent and the number of products exported by 
these countries by 21 percent.45 If exporting Mediterranean countries attained 
best trade practices prevailing in the European Union, predictions estimate that 
total exports from the countries analyzed would increase by some 40 percent 
on average. Countries have much to gain from improving sub-regional trade 
corridors, regional trade facilitation frameworks, and transit systems. 
There is robust evidence that a country is unlikely to become a major exporter 
if its firms do not have access to a wide variety of competitively priced inputs.46 
This includes access to services inputs, such as professional services and logistical 
support. The competitiveness of firms and their ability to use and participate 
in VCs is a function of the cost and quality of the inputs they have access to.
Sector-level measures of trade and F.D.I. policies are positively associated with 
manufacturing productivity: lower levels of trade policy restrictiveness and 
trade costs help improve the productivity of firms. This applies to services inputs 
as much as to goods.47
Barriers to trade and investment in services sectors often are significant in 
the region.48 Expanding production and exports of services will often require 
F.D.I. However, as noted previously, F.D.I. goes primarily to the energy/natural 
resource sector and to nontradables (real estate and construction), with little 
going to export-oriented manufacturing or high-tech services.49 Averaging 
across countries, services trade restrictiveness indices (S.T.R.I.)—a measure of 
barriers to trade and investment in services—in MENA is twice as high as in 
Europe and Central Asia (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Overall services trade restrictiveness index by region, 2010
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Note: Indices range from 0 to 100, with 100 being completely closed to foreign competition.  Data is only available for 
2010. 
Source: Compiled from World Bank, http://iresearch.worldbank.org/servicestrade/default.htm.
Morocco has the least restrictive services trade and investment policies 
among MENA economies, consistent with some of the sectoral performance 
measures discussed below. Professional and transport services tend to be the 
most restricted sectors in the MENA regions (Figure 3); the latter will have 
negative consequences for the efficiency of logistics-related services; the former 
for the productivity performance of firms in general given that professional 
services are one channel for the diffusion of knowledge regarding good practices 
(management consulting, accounting, legal services, etc.). 
Jafari and Tarr have estimated the ad valorem tariff equivalents (A.V.E.s) 
implied by the S.T.R.I.s reported by the World Bank, using the methodology 
developed by the staff of the Australian Productivity Commission.50 These 
suggest that there is significant variance in A.V.E.s across sectors and countries, 
with Morocco standing out as the country with the lowest levels of discrimination 
against foreign providers of air and road transport among the North African 
countries, but with significant levels of protection in the maritime transport 
sector (Table 2). Such high levels of trade restrictions reduce the ability of firms 
to participate in value chain-based production.
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Figure 3. Services trade restrictiveness indices by sector, 2010 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Algeria Bahrain Egypt Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Morocco Oman Qatar Saudi
Arabia
Yemen Tunisia
STRIs by Sector
Overall Finance Telecoms Retail Transport Prof. services
Note: Indices range from 0 to 100, with 100 being completely closed to foreign competition.  
Source: Compiled from World Bank, http://iresearch.worldbank.org/servicestrade/default.htm.
Table 2. Estimated ad valorem tariff equivalent of S.T.R.I.s (percent)
Sector Algeria Egypt Morocco Tunisia Turkey Bulgaria Romania
Accounting 56 56 27 79 75 20 37
Legal services 52 73 47 69 73 47 47
Air transport 55 40 0 39 44 0 37
Rail transport 93 93 59 90 93 84 84
Road 30 12 8 21 15 15 15
Banking 14 44 2 10 2 1 5
Insurance 28 35 26 29 14 17 18
Fixed line 10 18 13 12 6 5 5
Mobile line 10 13 9 9 5 4 5
Retail 5 7 1 6 1 1 1
Maritime 22 58 51 54 26 11 0
Source: Jafari and Tarr (2015), based on World Bank S.T.R.I. data.
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All this matters for economic performance. Hoekman and Shepherd show 
that local services productivity is an important determinant of manufacturing 
productivity at the firm level, with services productivity mattering more for 
those firms that use services relatively intensively in their overall input mix, 
and that this in turn impacts on merchandise trade performance.51 They also 
find that S.T.R.I.s are one determinant of the value of bilateral merchandise 
trade flows. Policies affecting investment in retail distribution and transport 
are particularly important—a result that is intuitive, given that these services 
directly affect the ability of goods producers to get their production to market. 
A country that maintains high barriers to trade in services, and that does not 
have a supportive business environment for investment, effectively taxes its 
firms and impedes their ability to be or become competitive on world markets. 
If there are both high tariffs on imports of intermediate products and barriers 
to trade and investment in services, this will negatively affect the prospects for 
firms to connect to international production networks and global supply chains.
Additional Measures to Boost 
Integration
Of course, more than an open trade regime is needed to develop competitive 
services sector offerings domestically. Infrastructure, education, and the quality 
of institutions and governance matter greatly. Beverelli, Fiorini, and Hoekman 
find that the positive economic effects of more open services trade regimes 
on downstream sectors are strongly conditional on the quality of economic 
governance and related institutions.52 The implication is that countries with 
better institutional and business environments will benefit from a more open 
services trade regime. Beverelli et al. argue that their finding may be due to 
the characteristics of services and services trade. The non-storability of many 
services often will require a foreign firm to invest or otherwise establish a physical 
presence in an importing market to provide a service. This in turn subjects the 
firm to local regulation and the prevailing business environment.
A large part of the competitiveness reform agenda revolves around improving 
the operation of services sectors. Trucking services are an example. Informality 
and relatively short distances prevent the emergence of a network of high-quality 
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medium-size transport operators, which has implications not only for logistics, 
but also for road safety and urban management. Intermediary professions (e.g., 
brokers, agents) also tend to be fragmented, with insufficient quality control and 
nationality requirements for brokers in some countries, reducing competition. 
These are areas where some countries have been pursing action. Morocco has 
implemented measures to abolish nationality requirements for brokers, promoted 
the development of new logistics services for the manufacturing industry (e.g., 
logistics zones in Tangier and Casablanca), opened up the sector to F.D.I., and 
adopted new customs procedures that are more suitable for logistics activities.53 
The World Bank’s Logistics Performance Indicators (L.P.I.s) provide a 
comprehensive measure of the overall quality of logistics services across 160 
countries.54 LPI level has been found to be an important determinant of the 
trade costs that prevail between any given pair of countries: improving LPI 
performance would reduce average bilateral trade costs ten times more than 
an equivalent percentage reduction in average tariffs.55 Many countries have 
registered improvements in LPI scores since this data began to be collected in 
2007, although Tunisia and the U.A.E. are perceived by transporters and traders
Figure 4: Logistics Performance Index, 2014
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as having seen a deterioration in trade logistics performance during the 2007-
14 period. There is substantial heterogeneity in country performance, with the 
G.C.C. countries perceived to have the best logistics performance, approaching 
that observed in the European Union. (Figure 4).
Road transport is the dominant mode of regional transport. The region 
has extremely limited railway connectivity. However, air transport linkages 
have expanded substantially in the last 15 years, and there have been major 
improvements in liner shipping connectivity. Between 2004 and 2014 the 
U.A.E., Morocco, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Jordan all 
registered an increase in liner shipping connectivity, in some cases more than 
tripling (Morocco, Lebanon). Four MENA countries are in the global top 20 for 
liner shipping connectivity: the U.A.E. (ranked 14th in 2014), Morocco (15), 
Egypt (17) and Saudi Arabia (18).56 That said, transport and logistics related 
costs remain a major burden.57
Addressing Sources of Underperformance: 
(How) Can Regional Cooperation Help?
While there is still much to be done to improve the incentive structure 
confronting firms in tradable activities, some MENA countries have increased 
rates of participation in international VCs—e.g., Tunisia and Jordan—and some 
have been successful in attracting F.D.I. in advanced manufacturing sectors—
e.g., Morocco. On some dimensions, policy regimes in a number of MENA 
economies are comparable to those in countries that have been much more 
successful in leveraging trade opportunities into sustained economic growth.58 
What is missing is sufficient volume, or a sustained step increase in export 
production and performance, driven by productive firms that are leaders in their 
sector.59 Research has identified a number of policy factors that underlie the 
weak trade performance, and there have been decades of piecemeal and partial 
efforts to put in place a more supportive incentive framework. The challenge is 
to recognize and deal with the political economy factors that result in policies—
and the absence of policies—that create high transaction costs and uncertainty. 
There is a vast literature that generally finds that better performance on 
the types of indicators discussed above is associated with better economic 
outcomes. While this literature is useful at a general level, it is not always helpful 
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in assisting governments and stakeholders to identify priority areas for reform 
or to mobilize and sustain action to improve matters. In the case of MENA 
countries, there is a long-standing line of research that points to the dominant 
role of the state as an employer, including in industrial activities and rent-
seeking and rent-protection efforts by politically connected agents, as well as 
through trade policy-related lobbying.60 Post-Arab Spring, the importance of 
such ‘crony capitalism’ has become more transparent and clearly documented 
in several of the countries concerned (Egypt, Tunisia), based on new data that 
became available on the ownership and control of industries, and the behavior 
of companies that were politically connected to the regime.61
In practice, there will often be several policy areas that jointly need to be the 
focus of reform efforts. Dealing with one without dealing with others that reduce 
the contestability of a market or create high costs may make little difference. A 
consequence is that top-down efforts to improve a country’s performance on 
one or more specific trade policy metrics may not have the desired impacts as 
they do not change the underlying political economy dynamics. An example 
is a program to reduce import tariffs for goods that are subject to exclusive 
distribution arrangements: lower tariffs may then not do anything to lower 
prices for consumers; instead what used to be collected as tariff revenue by the 
government will now simply be transferred to exclusive license holders. Major 
efforts to automate customs so as to improve clearance times may do little to 
reduce the cost it takes to get goods from the port to the retailer or the factory 
gate because of a lack of competition in the road transport sector. The same is 
true for international cooperation. Fixing a customs post on a land border with 
a neighboring country may do little if the neighbor has an inefficient regime 
that creates blockages or generates high transactions costs. In many areas of 
policy, bilateral or regional cooperation is a necessary condition for reducing 
trade transactions costs or permitting any trade to occur at all. Examples include 
access to and interconnection of telecom and financial services, the treatment of 
e-commerce transactions, digital trade and data security, the ability of providers 
of services that are based in one country to use infrastructure in another, and 
so forth. More specifically, there may be a need for investment in regional 
connectivity and associated infrastructure.
There is undoubtedly scope for regional integration to boost trade and 
related economic activity in MENA countries. This is most obviously the case 
for countries that have been or are in conflict—Iraq, Iran, Syria—and that 
Intra-Regional Trade 19
historically have traded with each other or are simply neighbors. In other parts 
of the region, it is less obvious that intra-regional trade has great potential 
relative to trade with the rest of the world. Part of the question here is whether 
regional initiatives can help capture gains in areas outside narrowly defined 
trade in goods or services and more generally be used to deal with the political 
economy underlying the policies—and absence or ineffectiveness of policies—
that have led to low-level equilibrium traps and reduced the economic returns 
to past reform efforts. 
Economic integration with neighboring markets has been an effective 
component of the growth strategies of many countries. Free trade agreements 
(F.T.A.s) offer one path toward greater regional integration; customs unions 
and common markets 
another. An F.T.A. 
allows members to 
retain full independence 
or sovereignty regarding 
external tariffs on third 
countries, while the 
parties provide tariff-
free access to imports originating in their countries. A customs union requires 
members to adopt the same trade policy, i.e., the same external tariffs, as well as 
mechanisms to distribute tariff revenues to member countries and to determine 
what external trade policy should be. Members of customs unions are precluded 
from negotiating F.T.A.s with other countries. Research has shown that the 
greatest benefits from trade agreements come from the deep aspects of the 
agreements involving removal of N.T.M.-related costs, not from the preferential 
tariff liberalization.62
PAFTA and the G.C.C. are the two primary trade integration agreements 
among MENA countries.63 The G.C.C. is the deepest integration arrangement 
in the region, with the aim being to create a common market and monetary 
union among the six member states. The transition period to the G.C.C. 
customs union—the common external tariff—was fully completed in 2015, and 
substantial progress has been made in permitting cross-border movement of 
citizens and capital. PAFTA is a looser arrangement that operates under the 
auspices of the Arab League. It includes the G.C.C. members as well as the 
Maghreb and Mashreq states.64 The focus of PAFTA has been on removal of 
“Post-Arab Spring, the importance 
of such ‘crony capitalism’ has 
become more transparent and 
clearly documented”
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tariffs on intra-PAFTA trade. This was mostly achieved by the late 2000s with 
the exception of excluded lists of products, which in some cases cover a large 
number of products—as in the case of Algeria. Moreover, restrictive rules of 
origin mean that traders may still have to pay tariffs.65 Surveys suggest that 
various N.T.M.s are more important as a source of intra-regional trade barriers, 
including product standards and regulatory requirements.66
In principle, the aim of PAFTA is to extend services trade and investment 
policies as well as non-tariff barriers to intra-PAFTA exchange, but little progress 
has been achieved in these areas. Arab League countries have indicated that 
the long-term goal is to establish an Arab customs union/common market.67 
Achieving this will prove to be difficult given the need to agree on common policies 
in a variety of areas, 
including a common 
external tariff. The strong 
resistance by states 
in the region to cede 
sovereignty suggests that 
the customs union/common market path is not a credible prospect.68 PAFTA 
permits members states to conclude bilateral or regional trade agreements with 
other countries. Most MENA countries have F.T.A.s with the European Union; 
many have a F.T.A. with the United States; and some have concluded F.T.A.s 
with Turkey. PAFTA members have also signed F.T.A.s amongst subsets of Arab 
countries—as in the example of the 2003 Agadir Agreement between Egypt, 
Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan. This goes further than PAFTA in the area of rules 
of origin, government procurement, and other non-tariff policies. The G.C.C. 
is, of course, the premier instance of a deeper integration arrangement among a 
subset of PAFTA members.
Research has consistently found that MENA trade agreements have done little 
to promote trade.69 One reason is that with the exception of the G.C.C., Arab 
countries have generally failed to seriously implement most of the preferential 
trade agreements that have been agreed upon since the 1960s. Fawzy argues 
that concerns over the distribution of gains from integration across and within 
countries, a desire to retain national sovereignty, and the potential adjustment 
costs resulting from increased competition explain the weak implementation.70 
This suggests a need to put in place institutional mechanisms that can address 
the political economy factors impeding closer integration. It also suggests 
“Research has consistently found 
that MENA trade agreements 
have done little to promote trade.”
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focusing on policy areas where sovereignty concerns are less prevalent and 
the economic payoffs to joint action are significant. The potential payoffs of 
targeting cooperation to further integrate the markets for services and factors 
of production—key ‘inputs’ that determine productivity and competitiveness 
of firms—appear to be large, suggesting that this could be a focus of regional 
cooperation.
It is doubtful that an ambitious ‘top-down’ regional initiative of the type that 
has long been a central feature of MENA international relations will do more 
than has been possible in the past to remove N.T.M.s. This observation may 
not apply to the deep and comprehensive free trade agreements (D.C.F.T.A.s) 
that the European Union is seeking to negotiate with Tunisia and Morocco. 
However, even in that context, much depends on the design of the associated 
implementation mechanisms, the degree to which convergence with E.U. norms 
in the various policy areas will occur, and how much this will result in greater 
efficiency (lower trade costs). Experience with D.C.F.T.A.s with countries 
in Eastern Europe suggests that to be effective in generating improved trade 
conditions for firms, there is a need to tailor them to the specific institutional 
circumstances of a partner country and for flexibility in both the substance and 
sequencing of implementation of reforms.71
Potential Areas of Cooperation
Hoekman and Messerlin conclude that focusing (limiting) cooperation efforts 
to specific policy issues where there are clearly defined benefits for specific 
groups or stakeholders may offer greater prospects to reduce trade costs and 
integrate markets.72 Focusing on areas of cooperation where issues of sovereignty 
are less problematic and the economic payoffs to joint action (cooperation) are 
significant should help increase support for regional integration initiatives. Trade 
facilitation and better regional connectivity to lower trade transaction costs are 
possible focal points. Given that any border crossing by definition involves two 
countries, effective trade facilitation will require cooperation. The same is true 
for enhancing the contestability of transport services markets—such as air and 
road transport—through agreement on the equivalence of standards, or through 
agreement to permit transporters supply services without confronting additional 
costs or entry barriers, are actions that benefit all sectors of economic activity. 
Another potential area for deeper cooperation could involve the establishment 
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of regional regulatory bodies to oversee network services (telecommunications, 
electricity, railways, air transport).73 Many of the countries in the region have 
adopted competition laws, but there are large differences in the substance of 
competition regimes. Cooperation in this field, building on international 
experience, could generate significant benefits, including as a means to combat 
‘crony capitalism’-type anti-competitive arrangements. While substantive 
convergence in such sensitive areas of economic policy will be difficult, regional 
cooperation could help increase transparency, awareness, and accountability 
through objective analysis and advocacy.
What is needed are approaches that identify the policy areas that matter most in 
terms of negative impacts on (potential) exporting firms and that require action 
by two or more governments. This must start with generating information on 
how complementary ‘bundles’ of policies impact incentives to invest. The way 
policies and public expenditure (investments) are designed and implemented 
by governments differs significantly from how businesses go about assessing 
investment decisions and organize their production. Businesses think ‘supply 
chains,’ whereas governments focus on specific policy instruments that are under 
the control of a particular authority or entity. Progress in addressing barriers to 
trade may be facilitated if the value chain methodology used by businesses is 
applied to identify desirable policy reforms and priorities for cross-border or 
regional cooperation.74 This need not occur in the framework of a formal trade 
agreement or extant Arab integration initiatives such as PAFTA.
Trade agreements are potential instruments to reduce the effects of protectionist 
policies and N.T.M.s. The problem is that if political will is missing, and political 
economy forces are too strong, implementation of an agreement will be partial 
at best. Past Arab integration initiatives have been ambitious on paper, aiming 
for the creation of common markets and an economic union. This continues to 
be the case: in 2009 the Arab League agreed to pursue an Arab Customs Union, 
to be operational by January 2015. This deadline, as have many before it, came 
and went. In practice, the political will and commitment to implement such 
initiatives have been missing75 and this continues to be the case. A necessary 
condition for reducing N.T.M.-related trade costs is that negatively affected 
interest groups have sufficient incentives to sustain the focus and effort needed 
to ensure implementation of reforms. The challenge is to identify areas where 
there are clear ‘win-wins’ in the sense that groups in the different countries 
involved have strong incentives to push for cooperation by their governments 
Intra-Regional Trade 23
to implement desirable reforms, and to put in place mechanisms through which 
such groups can hold their governments accountable for results.
The traditional approach to negotiating trade agreements fits poorly with the 
reality of how international production is organized. Trade agreements are not 
designed with a view to assist governments to put in place a policy environment 
that will support vertical specialization and integration of firms into international 
value chains. They generally do not engage much with private sector interests or 
communities that have a strong stake in reducing cross-border trade frictions. 
Hoekman suggests that one way of determining priorities and defining an action 
agenda is through the creation of public-private partnerships that involve the 
active engagement of the business community, economic policy officials, and 
civil society groups, organized around the supply chain as a whole in a sector.76 In 
practice, there often will be several factors that generate impediments to trade. If 
only one policy area 
is addressed, another 
may turn out to be 
equally constraining. 
To most effectively 
lower trade costs, 
information is needed on the specific sources of trade frictions. To generate 
such information, mechanisms need to be designed that support cooperation 
between the groups in society that are negatively affected.
Rather than seeking to address trade problems through traditional government-
to-government negotiations and trade agreements, bottom-up, specific 
initiatives may be more effective in mobilizing the engagement and support 
of business on both sides of a border. Business representatives and industry 
organizations have hands-on knowledge of the impacts of prevailing policies 
and the potential returns to investment in specific areas. Business interests and 
affected communities on both sides of a border are likely to have many common 
interests in lowering trade costs. Such bottom-up efforts will by their nature 
involve subsets of countries and may well be limited to bilateral cooperation. 
In other instances a number of countries will be implicated, for instance in 
infrastructure-related investments and related policy reforms to enhance 
connectivity within a region. What the focal points for cooperation might be 
are endogenous and need to be determined through public-private partnerships 
and processes along the lines just discussed. This can build on the extensive 
“Trade agreements are potential 
instruments to reduce the effects of 
protectionist policies and NTMs.”
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research and analysis of sources of trade costs and market segmentation in the 
region, some of which was discussed in Section 2. The main point is that top-
down textbook types of regional integration are unlikely to be effective. This does 
not mean they are not relevant or should be abandoned, but that businesses and 
communities need to be mobilized in ways that trade agreements have not done 
and are unlikely to do. Indeed, there may be scope to use existing institutional 
mechanisms to provide an ‘authorizing framework’ for the proposed integration 
à la carte approach. 
Conclusion
Addressing the constraints that, to date, have prevented many MENA countries 
from benefiting more fully from the opportunities offered by both regional 
and global markets can potentially do much to help generate the employment 
and income growth that is so urgently needed. For regional integration to be a 
useful instrument for governments to do what is needed, it must contribute to 
overcoming the political economy forces that have held Arab countries back for 
decades. It is not at all obvious that intra-Arab cooperation based on traditional 
trade and investment agreements will be able to play such a positive role. Outside 
of the G.C.C., the track record to date has been dismal. Those countries that 
have done best essentially have gone their own way and focused on either the 
large market to the north (Morocco/Tunisia—European Union) or pursued a 
global strategy anchored on diversification into services (U.A.E.). 
There are two complementary ways of regarding opportunities to pursue 
regional cooperation with a view to promoting cross-border trade and 
investment. One is to view it through the lens of supporting or cementing 
peaceful relations—as was the case for the establishment of the European Coal 
and Steel Community in 1951. Another is to take a more narrow economic 
perspective and to focus on projects and programs that generate direct gains to 
communities in participating countries by addressing coordination failures and 
capturing economies of scale. Whatever point of view is taken, it is important 
that efforts to re-energize regional integration efforts be part of a strategy to 
make Arab countries more competitive in general. What is needed are measures 
that will stimulate investment (F.D.I. and domestic) and employment in export 
activities broadly defined, including direct and indirect exports of services. The 
latter are a key driver of overall productivity and may be one area where on a 
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sectoral basis there are incentives for regional cooperation to play a positive 
role, such as connectivity, network infrastructure and related services.77
Regional cooperation may be best pursued on an à la carte, bottom-up, 
pragmatic basis—as opposed to relying on the type of trade agreements that have 
been the focal point to date in the region and largely failed to deliver. Formally, 
the top-down, traditional approach toward regional integration continues to 
be the purported goal in the context of the Arab League—as exemplified by 
the stated goal of moving from the Pan-Arab Free Trade Area to a customs 
union. The difficulties that were experienced by G.C.C. countries in agreeing to 
a common external tariff, despite being a group of countries that mostly had low 
tariffs to start with, illustrate 
how difficult it will be to achieve 
this objective. It would seem 
more feasible, both politically 
and in terms of generating 
win-win outcomes, to use the 
PAFTA structure that is already in place as an umbrella to pursue measures that 
are more piecemeal. These could be limited to subsets of countries that have 
direct interests in joining forces on specific investment/infrastructure programs 
or collaborating to reform specific policies (non-tariff measures) that preclude 
investment by the private sector in projects that involve value chain activities 
spanning a number of MENA countries. 
The historical experience of Europe points to the large potential payoffs of 
creative use of regional cooperation to generate economic incentives to sustain 
peace and security. If countries in the region are able to pursue a similar strategy, 
building pragmatically on multiple fronts on a decentralized basis, this can 
help establish conditions for greater shared prosperity. If, instead, they continue 
to pursue a business-as-usual approach of prioritizing regional competition 
over cooperation, this will increase the pressure on individual countries and 
polities to accept and implement urgently needed economic policy reforms on 
their own.
“Regional cooperation may be 
best pursued on an à la carte, 
bottom-up, pragmatic basis.”
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